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With Liberty and Justice for Some: How Felony Disenfranchisement Undermines 
American Democracy 
Abstract 
This paper examines the damaging effects of felony disenfranchisement on American democracy. The 
premise of American democracy is to include citizens in government processes, thus, felony 
disenfranchisement is inherently anti-democratic. The first section analyzes the historical timeline of the 
origins and prominence of felony disenfranchisement dating back to Ancient Greece. The paper considers 
the legal standing of felony disenfranchisement by examining relevant court cases, such as Richardson v. 
Ramirez (1974). Following this, a case study of the states that practice distinct levels of felony 
disenfranchisement, ranging from the most punitive states to the most permissive, is presented. The 
paper then addresses the modern challenges regarding the legality of felony disenfranchisement and the 
shifts in American philosophy regarding corrections through a case study of Florida. This paper 
concludes with an examination of the constitutionality of the practice at its core. It suggests potential 
solutions for American policymakers to consider as the American political consciousness continues to 
shift from punitive correctional policy to less punitive. 
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This paper examines the damaging effects of felony 
disenfranchisement on American democracy. The premise of 
American democracy is to include citizens in government 
processes, thus, felony disenfranchisement is inherently anti-
democratic. The first section analyzes the historical timeline of the 
origins and prominence of felony disenfranchisement dating back 
to Ancient Greece. The paper considers the legal standing of 
felony disenfranchisement by examining relevant court cases, 
such as Richardson v. Ramirez (1974). Following this, a case 
study of the states that practice distinct levels of felony 
disenfranchisement, ranging from the most punitive states to the 
most permissive, is presented. The paper then addresses the 
modern challenges regarding the legality of felony 
disenfranchisement and the shifts in American philosophy 
regarding corrections through a case study of Florida. This paper 
concludes with an examination of the constitutionality of the 
practice at its core. It suggests potential solutions for American 
policymakers to consider as the American political consciousness 
continues to shift from punitive correctional policy to less 
punitive.  
Keywords: Voting, disenfranchisement, punitive policy, 
American politics 
1
Staufenbeil: With Liberty and Justice for Some






The right to vote is an idea engraved into Americans’ heads 
beginning in early history classes and reiterated throughout 
schooling. The American public-school curriculum does not hide 
that the right to vote was not historically universal. Students learn 
of the Women’s Suffrage Movement and then the Voting Rights 
Act, which protected the right to vote for African Americans, but 
this is by-and-large where voting rights discussion ends in 
schools. Today, the right to vote is far from evenly distributed and 
often withdrawn from entire populations of individuals nationally. 
Felony disenfranchisement refers to the revocation of voting 
rights for those convicted of a crime as a "collateral consequence 
of their felony convictions" (Behrens et al., 2003, p. 559). The 
United States has a long history of disenfranchisement legislation, 
with many state constitutions featuring a variation of 
disenfranchisement policies dating back to 1776 (Keyssar, 2009). 
According to a 2016 report by The Sentencing Project, 48 states 
practice some form of felony disenfranchisement. Such 
widespread policy has amounted to "more than four million 
Americans...currently unable to vote due to these laws" (Figler, 
2006, p. 725).  
Historically, the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
justified race- and class-motivated, state-sanctioned methods of 
revoking voting rights. The Supreme Court decision in 
Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) sealed the validity of felony 
disenfranchisement by establishing the legal basis of citing the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the grounds for permissibility. Since 
the decision in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), scholars and 
activists of the last few decades have begun to challenge the 
validity of felony disenfranchisement as a punitive practice. Some 
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states have begun to move away from more punitive criminal 
justice policies characteristic of the last few decades. The result is 
a nation of states with differing access to the right to vote and left 
in its wake is a fragmented and stratified democracy. Furthermore, 
because felony disenfranchisement hinders a functional 
democracy, aspects of these laws are likely illegal, have 
disproportionately affected minorities, and are unjust in intent and 
results.        
The Role of the Vote 
The right to vote is a cornerstone value of American 
democracy and protected by the Constitution. Barring individuals 
from their right to vote impedes the function of a democracy, both 
normatively and legally. However, some assert that 
disenfranchising felons is the appropriate response to a knowing 
act of breaching the social contract. Both of these viewpoints are 
codified in the constitutions of various states in the US, making 
them useful for a case study of the issue of felony 
disenfranchisement.  
America presents itself as a democracy built upon the 
principle of serving all people. The people’s collective voice 
guides the hand of democratically produced legislation, policy, 
and elected representatives. Being a stakeholder in the democratic 
process is a distinctly and closely held American sentiment; one 
has a right to vote on tax spending, who represents their interests 
in government, and more general functions to preserve all “other 
rights” (Shapiro, 1993, p. 544). Participating in the electoral 
process is the purest manifestation of “buying into a society and 
its structures and norms” (King, 2007, p. 253). Furthermore, 
access to the electoral process is an integral part of democracy, 
based on the principle that representation serves as a means to 
identify the good of the whole public rather than a selection of the 
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whole. Pettus (2004) expands on this concept, noting that “the 
practice of felony disenfranchisement is a product of an ‘us versus 
them’ mentality.” Society views individuals with felony 
convictions as so vastly different and undeserving of political 
rights (p. 5). Felony disenfranchisement disqualifies an entire 
section of the US population from voting, and therefore, produces 
a voting electorate—which functions to benefit only the good of 
the part. American democracy cannot function when it operates 
only for the good of some of its people rather than all of them. 
The Rise of Felony Disenfranchisement 
The concept of revoking a person’s voting rights in response 
to criminal behavior appears in various forms throughout history. 
The practice originated in ancient Greek lawmaking, evolved into 
medieval Europe’s concept of “civil death,” and later manifests in 
Britain with the concept of “outlawry” (Brooks, 2005, p. 102). 
Disenfranchisement appears as early as the 1600s as a punishment 
for morality crimes, such as drunkenness (Brooks, 2005). This 
concept of civil death, or "the condition in which a convicted 
offender loses all political, civil, and legal rights", manifests in the 
philosophies of those who influenced early American thought 
(Ewald, 2012, p. 1049). Scholars like John Locke, whose ideas 
influenced many of America's principles and institutions, affirm 
the practice of disenfranchisement as the proper punishment for 
acting against society’s interest (Brooks, 2005).  
Disenfranchisement makes an official appearance in many of 
the early state constitutions in the US. Brooks (2005) notes, "from 
1776 to 1821, eleven states adopted constitutions that 
disenfranchised felons or permitted their statutory 
disenfranchisement," and this number continued to grow (p.103). 
The practice was not widely debated in the early American years 
and viewed as necessary in sustaining the "purity of the ballot 
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box" based on archaic, theoretical notions of "republican liberty" 
(Pettus, 2004, p. 141). Furthermore, King (2007) mentions in his 
discussion that, during this time, voting privileges were already 
selective: white property-owning men were the voting-eligible 
population of this time, and because of this, felony 
disenfranchisement “drew limited attention” with narrow-
reaching effects (p. 249). It was not until the Reconstruction Era 
that the American franchise would begin to expand to include a 
new group of voters.  
The Reconstruction Era ushered in new opportunities and 
protections for those previously excluded from the franchise, 
namely freed black men, largely due to the passage of the 13th and 
14th Amendments. The 13th Amendment, most notably, 
abolished slavery. The 14th Amendment established the Equal 
Protection Clause, which grants every American indiscriminate 
treatment under the law—one person is not entitled to more of the 
government’s legal protection than another. Section 2 of the 14th 
Amendment discusses the concept of proportional representation 
in Congress and describes potential instances in which revocation 
of voting rights is acceptable, though this part of the section 
historically raises debate. Subsequent judicial interpretations of 
these amendments are blighted with racial animus. The language 
in the 13th Amendment, for example, reveals the caveat that 
slavery is still constitutionally permissible as a “punishment for a 
crime.” (U.S. Const. Amend XIII § 1). Additionally, the 13th 
Amendment abolished private slavery but sanctioned the rise of a 
new kind of slavery: state slavery. The case of Ruffin v. 
Commonwealth (1871) affirmed the idea of state slavery when 
Virginia Supreme Court referred to prisoners as ‘‘slaves of the 
state” (Ghali, 2008, p. 608). Despite the optimism of the 
Reconstruction Era, challenges to black suffrage would persist, as 
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“Jim Crow came to dominate the South as Reconstruction ended, 
and blacks were socially and politically excluded from full 
participation in the life of the nation” (Brooks, 2005, p. 108). Jim 
Crow would bring new practices aimed at excluding black people 
from the franchise and tools like “poll taxes, grandfather clauses, 
and property tests, as well as literacy tests and intimidation” 
(Brooks, 2005, p. 107). The 13th and 14th Amendments are 
crucial factors in discussing felony disenfranchisement: First, they 
were important in establishing civil rights and protections for 
former slaves and, more broadly, American citizens. Second, they 
have been used to curtail voting rights as they leave an exorbitant 
amount of state leverage to enact voting restrictions and ambiguity 
for interpretation.  
The 1960s marked another era of goals for the suffrage of 
marginalized groups. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 signified 
another attempt to remedy the injustice of the years prior, as it 
“was tremendously effective in extending suffrage to black 
Americans” (Brooks, 2005, p. 110). The Voting Rights Act 
functioned as a measure to ensure the implementation of the 15th 
Amendment. The Voting Rights Act “suspended literacy tests and 
other ‘devices’ [aimed at obstructing access to the polls for people 
of color]” (Keyssar, 2009, p. 211). Further, federal examiners sent 
to monitor ensured full abandonment in the states previously 
practicing them. Though the Voting Rights Act made more 
obvious acts of racially motivated voter suppression illegal, felony 
disenfranchisement has continue to remain legally permissible 
and widely practiced. Felony disenfranchisement is one way how 
racial discrimination prevailed long after the Voting Rights Act, 
working as an extension of practices like the poll tax. The success 
of felony disenfranchisement derives from the subtlety of its 
nature (Shapiro, 1993). Historically, the practice "provided 
6




VOLUME VIII & IX • 2021 
Southern states with ‘insurance’ if courts struck down more 
blatantly unconstitutional clauses" (Shapiro, 1993, p. 538). This 
philosophy has proved successful, and decades of the practice 
would follow, unchecked and affirmed by law. 
The validity of felony disenfranchisement was established in 
the case of Richardson v. Ramirez (1974). When felony 
disenfranchisement came under judicial scrutiny, “felon 
disenfranchisement laws were almost always found to be 
constitutional” (Brooks, 2005, p. 110). Richardson v. Ramirez 
(1974) involved three convicted felons who had served their 
sentence, completed probation, and were still unable to register to 
vote. The trio convened a lawsuit in response. The Supreme Court 
of California held that "disenfranchisement of felons who had 
served their time and completed parole... was a violation of equal 
protection under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment" 
(Brooks, 2005, p. 111). The Supreme Court found otherwise and 
stated that Section 2 of the 14th Amendment expressly indicated 
that the practice was constitutional and that the framers intended 
to "exclude felons from the franchise" (Brooks, 2005, p. 111). The 
Court found felony disenfranchisement to be distinguishable from 
other forms of voter suppression in that there is "affirmative 
sanction" for the practice in the language of Section 2 of the 14th 
Amendment (Brooks, 2005). The decision in Richardson v. 
Ramirez (1974) codified the legality of felony 
disenfranchisement. It worked to further seal the fate of felony 
disenfranchisement as a policy taken for granted by the American 
electorate.  
The Tough on Crime Era 
Most states still practice some form of felon 
disenfranchisement policy. For the last few decades, the Tough on 
Crime movement largely shaped. According to Greene (2002), 
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American politics of the 1980s was characterized by “a perceived 
need to ‘get tough’ on crime” (p. 11). The justice system 
underwent numerous changes that had lasting implications during 
this time, as “18 states passed mandatory minimum sentencing 
laws," and the behaviors that constituted a felony widened to 
include non-violent offenses as well (Greene, 2002, p. 11). The 
metamorphosis of the American view of crime during this time 
gave rise to a generation of punitive, and often racially driven, 
policies like the War on Drugs, which put thousands of people 
behind bars for non-violent drug offenses. These punitive policies 
are responsible for the exponential growth of the United States’ 
incarcerated population over the last few decades. According to 
the Sentencing Project, "there are 2.2 million people in the [United 
States’] prisons and jails––a 500% increase over the last 40 years" 
(The Sentencing Project, n.d.). Mass incarceration plays a 
prominent role in the impact of felony disenfranchisement 
policies. With such a vast number of incarcerated individuals, 
many of whom will participate in parole or probation even after 
they are released, the population of voting-disqualified individuals 
in the United States is sizable. The recent decades of policies that 
have given rise to mass incarceration have resulted in the number 
of disenfranchised Americans increasing by nearly 5 million since 
the 1970s (Uggene et al., 2016). Being tough on crime remained 
the American correctional system’s prevailing philosophy for 
decades, and felony disenfranchisement’s impact would deepen as 
the number of convicted persons grew at exponential rates.  
The reality of felony disenfranchisement policies is that they 
do not affect people equally. Mass incarceration and felony 
disenfranchisement have disproportionately affected people of 
color, especially African Americans. These racial disparities have 
amounted to a system that discriminately disenfranchised Black 
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voters: 1 in 12 cannot vote because of a felony conviction; for 
men, 1 in 8 cannot vote disenfranchised (King, 2007). The 
implications include reduced political engagement and lower 
registration numbers; however, less obvious is vote dilution and 
barriers to reentry for those returning to their communities after 
being incarcerated (King, 2007). Vote dilution is a theory that the 
African American community is distinctly weakened due to the 
high numbers of its population barred from voting. Felony 
disenfranchisement affects more than the disenfranchised 
individual and weakens the communal vote of African Americans 
as a whole (King, 2007).  
Furthermore, the United States' Correctional System is driven 
by a purpose of any combination of "retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation" to transform the criminal into a 
functioning member of society (Russo et al., 2017, p. 3). 
Functioning members of society work and functioning members 
of society vote, both of which are tasks that are markedly difficult 
for formerly incarcerated individuals to carry out in the wake of 
civil death. The process of prisoner reentry into the community 
suffers, as voting is "both a symbolically expressive activist and a 
functional act that demonstrates a commitment to American 
institutions and means of political expression" (King, 2007, p. 
253). Impeding the opportunities for formerly incarcerated 
individuals to reenter society dampens the notion that they have 
agency in their lives, perpetuating high percentages of recidivism. 
The “Patchwork” 
The current state of disenfranchisement in America is a 
spectrum, with some states practicing permanent 
disenfranchisement, others allowing for voting in prison, and most 
states falling somewhere in between. As the ACLU refers to it, 
this fact leaves the US as a "patchwork" of disenfranchisement 
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policies. The current situation in the United States makes it 
impossible to discern the collective good, because of the stratified 
access that people with felony convictions have to voting. 
According to 2018 data from the Brennan Center for Justice, 
eighteen states restored voting rights after completing a sentence 
(including prison, parole, and probation). Fourteen states 
(including the District of Columbia) restore voting rights 
automatically upon release from prison. Ten states permanently 
disenfranchise "at least some people with criminal convictions, 
unless the government approves restoration;” four states 
automatically restore rights after "release from prison and 
discharge from parole (people on probation may vote);” two states 
permanently disenfranchise anyone with a felony conviction, and 
two states practice no disenfranchisement for people with criminal 
convictions (Brennan Center For Justice, 2018). The fact that there 
is no universally accessible electorate leave the strength of 
American democracy devastatingly muddled. 
Evaluating a more punitive state, like Kentucky, in 
comparison to a more permissive state, like Maine, demonstrates 
the spectrum of felony disenfranchisement policy in the United 
States. Kentucky is one of two states in the US that permanently 
bar people with felony convictions from voting (Equal Justice 
Initiative, 2007). The only way to attempt restoration for 
individuals who have completed their sentence is to "submit an 
Application for Restoration to Civil Rights to the Division of 
Probation and Parole, which then forwards it to the Governor for 
consideration" (Mauer & Kansal, 2005, p. 14). Mauer and Kansal 
(2005) note the process is arduous and that individuals must write 
an explanation of why they want to vote and submit “three letters 
of reference” (p. 3). Then, the fate of their voting privileges falls 
to the Governor’s discretion, who will either approve or deny their 
10
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application. According to data from the League of Women Voters, 
"more than 300,000 Kentuckians are barred from voting due to a 
felony conviction" (Equal Justice Initiative, 2017). Of the 
individuals disqualified from voting in Kentucky, 26.2% are 
African American, while only 8.3% of Kentucky's population is 
African American (United States Census Data). On the other end 
of the policy spectrum are states like Vermont, one of two states 
in the US that allow absentee ballot voting for people in prison. 
Vermont serves as a case study in the field of justice studies, as it 
appears that allowing individuals to retain the right to vote while 
incarcerated has not soiled the purity of the ballot box. These 
individuals are not electing people who are softer on crime and 
"appear to be concerned with the same issues as most Americans” 
like the economy or policies that affect their localities (King, 
2007, p. 259). For those working in Vermont’s justice department, 
the right to vote for incarcerated individuals is not a contested 
topic. This is reflected in the remarks by Chittenden County, 
“voting from prison does not negate their incarceration or any 
work done by law enforcement to put them there” (Nichanian, 
2019, para. 15). Many Vermont justice and corrections 
department professionals see it as a natural extension of the 
American right to vote. Vermont serves as a compelling example 
of the functionality of allowing incarcerated individuals to 
maintain their voting rights, and neither Vermont’s justice 
department nor the communities they serve in have suffered 
because of it.  
Solutions 
In recent years, the country has been undergoing another 
philosophical shift about the appropriate approach to correctional 
policies. Notably, the movement away from “Tough on Crime” 
policies exemplifies the new tone of criminal justice. The 
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increased awareness of the financial and societal costs of mass 
incarceration promotes to soften their criminal justice policies. 
Voters themselves are inclined to vote for policies that are more 
restorative than those in years prior. Florida, for example, recently 
restored voting rights to 1.5 million convicted felons (De La 
Garza, 2018). For Florida to amend their state constitution in this 
way is consequential because, for decades, it was a state that fell 
on the most extreme side of the spectrum of felony 
disenfranchisement practitioners. Florida previously was one of 
the states that, like Kentucky, permanently disenfranchised felons 
(De La Garza, 2018). In 2018, Florida voted to amend their 
constitution to restore voting rights for those who have completed 
their sentences. According to Public Citizen, "approximately 1.4 
million people will be granted the right to vote in Florida elections 
because of Amendment 4" (De La Garza, 2018, para. 3). This 
change to Florida’s constitution indicates a shift in the political 
mindset of voters. This example is especially compelling 
considering states like Florida, or Iowa and Kentucky, have 
represented the far more punitive end of the disenfranchisement 
policies for felons.  
Another example of this philosophical shift in America’s 
criminal justice policy is the recent passage of Proposition 47 in 
California. During the “Tough on Crime” Era, California voters 
passed the "Three Strikes and You're Out" law, which required 
mandatory sentencing and jail time for those convicted of an 
applicable crime (courts.ca.gov, n.d.). This policy, in particular, 
aided in introducing a problem of prison overcrowding in 
California. In 2014, Californians voted to pass Proposition 47: 
The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which responds to their 
state’s overcrowded prison problem. Proposition 47 sought to 
“ensure that prison spending is focused on violent and serious 
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offenses, to maximize alternatives for non-serious, non-violent 
crime, and to invest savings generated from [the proposition]” into 
alternative programming such as “victim services, and mental 
health and drug treatment” (courts.ca.gov, n.d.). Proposition 47 
changed some theft and drug possession offenses from felonies to 
misdemeanors, qualified individuals to petition current sentences 
that qualify as misdemeanors following the bill’s passage, and 
authorized qualifications to petition for reclassification of their 
sentences retroactively. These developments in policy are 
significant in a twofold manner. First, both Florida and California 
are two large and politically powerful states in the US. Second, 
both of these states have historically produced correctional 
policies that contribute to mass incarceration. Philosophical 
change coming from these highly influential states may prompt 
other states to follow suit. 
     At the academic level, experts have attempted to dispel the 
legality of the practice of felony disenfranchisement with a closer 
inspection of the legislation that has historically permitted it. 
Cosgrove (2004) asserts that the Supreme Court overlooked a few 
critical issues in deciding Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) and offers 
litigators insight into potential avenues to revisit the legal grounds 
of felony disenfranchisement. First is that the types of crimes that 
now warrant felony convictions, such as drug-related offenses, 
were not classified as such when the 14th Amendment was 
adopted (Cosgrove, 2004). Because these offenses were not 
captured under The Penalty of Loss of Representation of the 14th 
Amendment (The Penalty), they should not be adequate grounds 
for disenfranchisement. Additionally, Cosgrove (2004) asserts 
that because the holding in Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) centered 
on language that only mentions male ex-felons, it could be that the 
disenfranchisement of male ex-felons violates the 19th 
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Staufenbeil: With Liberty and Justice for Some




Amendment, which prohibits the denial of the right to vote on at 
the basis of sex. He goes on to mention that “the Penalty in Section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment [may be] inconsistent with the 
Nineteenth Amendment” (Cosgrove, 2004, p. 160). If this 
inconsistency is present, the Penalty in Section 2 of the 14th 
Amendment would then be considered repealed, and the mandates 
o Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) and implores litigators to bring 
these questions to trial, as they cast doubt as to the 
constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement. 
Shapiro (1993) takes a slightly different approach in his work 
to dispel the practice of felony disenfranchisement, citing a breach 
of voting protections codified by both the Constitution and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. He writes that Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act reveals the illegal nature of felony disenfranchisement 
as a racially discriminatory voting restriction and one that dilutes 
the vote of minority communities. Shapiro (1993) also calls upon 
a new litigation approach against felony disenfranchisement: 
stating that the intent and result of these policies were to operate 
"like the polls tax and literacy test" (p. 543), and as such, are 
illegal. Shapiro (1993) asserts that felony disenfranchisement is a 
barrier to the vote adopted with the intent and result being racially 
discriminatory. These findings are significant, as they indicate the 
potential for new litigation strategies to oppose the practice of 
felony disenfranchisement because they explicitly violate the 
law.  
Another consideration in the critique of felony 
disenfranchisement is the fact that it is an outdated practice. As 
the US enters a new era of criminal justice policies, characterized 
by attempts to break the cycles of reentry and discriminatory 
arrests, it is time to abandon the policies that have historically 
legitimized these forms of voter suppression. Felony 
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disenfranchisement, Shapiro notes, "is the only substantial voting 
restriction of the era that remains" (Shapiro, 1993, p. 538). 
According to researchers at the Rand Corporation, the US 
correction sector is beginning to focus on “reentry, specialty or 
problem-solving courts, restorative justice, [and] the value of 
treatment;” (Russo et al., 2007, p. 3-4). Several states have 
expanded their correctional mission statements to include reentry 
and reintegration into society post-incarceration. Felony 
disenfranchisement operates in direct opposition to the goals of 
contemporary criminal justice. Inhibiting the right to vote 
diminishes a sense of civic responsibility and agency in an 
individual's life and dilutes the collective voting power of the 
communities which incarcerated individuals belong to. It is time 
to shed these antiquated practices, as they serve no purpose toward 
criminal justice’s contemporary goals in the United States.  
Functional democracy is intrinsically linked to the equal and 
protected access to the vote. From the time the United States 
began formally drafting legislation, disenfranchisement has been 
a feature of its state constitutions, revealing a long-held sentiment 
that some deserve access to the democratic process and others do 
not. Another disturbing facet of this discriminatory policy how it 
has historically affected African American individuals at 
markedly higher levels. This idea that the law picks who is 
deserving of fundamental political rights is a direct threat to 
democracy and a continuation of racist policies that harken back 
to the era of private slave ownership. It would appear that in the 
wake of mass incarceration study and awareness, voters see the 
injustice of felony disenfranchisement. American politics is 
undergoing another distinct philosophical shift when it comes to 
the best approach to criminal justice, demonstrated in the case of 
Floridians voting to restore the vote for felons, a state long 
15
Staufenbeil: With Liberty and Justice for Some




characterized by strict corrections and felony disenfranchisement 
policies, and in California with its reformative Proposition 47 bill. 
In the wake of a changing electorate, lawmakers would do well to 
consider this shifting ideology and to examine the racial, societal, 
and economic implications of continuing to practice policies like 
felony disenfranchisement. Furthermore, scholars are working to 
introduce new perspectives into the Constitution’s historical 
interpretations and the influential court decisions on the 
prevalence of felony disenfranchisement. Hopefully, these new 
findings will prompt a new generation of litigators to bring forth 
a case against felony disenfranchisement.  
Justice for the franchise does not end at allowing felons to 
vote; the true testament to the responsiveness and durability of 
American democracy will be the oversight in the implementation 
of these policies. Ballot booths in prisons, for example, could 
become grounds for voter intimidation at the hands of prison 
employees without proper oversight. Furthermore, the abolition of 
felony enfranchisement is a temporary fix to a deeper institutional 
problem. America needs a more holistic approach address the 
underlying racial animus that is still present in the country. A 
restored right means very little if an individual's legal status is as 
good as civilly dead. Sustainable justice begins at humanizing 
incarcerated individuals, opening avenues of reentry upon 
completion of a sentence, and working consciously to end the 
practice of disproportionately arresting people of color. In its most 
pure form, justice cannot be achieved without the combination of 
these factors, though the abolition of felony disenfranchisement is 
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